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OUT WITH THE NEW, IN WITH THE OLD:
RECONSIDERING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS CREATED IN
CORTEZ V. MCCAULEY
KEVIN D. PIERCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cortez v. McCauley,' an en banc Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is subsumed within a Fourth
Amendment unlawful seizure claim.2 The court held that the two claims constituted
two separate causes of action, and in so holding overruled a previous decision by
a three judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.3 However, the en banc
court did not unanimously agree as to the proper analytical framework. Instead, the
en banc majority announced one approach,4 while Judge Hartz proposed a different
approach in a separate opinion.5 While undoubtedly motivated by achieving the
most equitable and legally sound analytical framework for excessive force claims
arising in connection with a Fourth Amendment seizure, the en banc majority
created a rigid and artificial framework that poses significant analytical and
equitable problems. Similarly, Judge Hartz's alternative approach, while appealing
at first glance, ultimately proves overly complex and invasive. Thus, the en banc
court erred in overruling the previous panel decision.
Part II of this Note begins with an analysis of the background law that guided the
court's analysis and decision, encompassing the statutory and constitutional causes
of action and defenses.6 Part III summarizes the facts of the case and details both the
panel and en banc decisions by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.7 Finally, Part
IV of this Note analyzes the en banc court's adoption of a new analytical framework
for excessive force claims and offers a proposed alternative approach.' This Note
argues that the approach announced by the panel decision should be reinstated and
expanded.9 Specifically, this Note suggests that all claims of excessive force
stemming from an unlawful seizure should be subsumed within one claim that
considers the alleged excessive force as an element of damages instead of as a
separate cause of action. 0 While ultimately acknowledging that the adoption of
such an approach may not occur for some time, this Note urges the reconsideration
of the approach adopted by the en banc court."

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2009. The author thanks Professor Rob Schwartz,
Professor Carol Suzuki, Jared DeJong, and Robert Lucero for their valuable support and editorial assistance.
1. 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
2. Id. at 1112, 1126-27.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1127.
5. Id. at 1133-35.
6. See infra Part HI.
7. See infra Part Ill.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra PartsTV, V.
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11. BACKGROUND LAW
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In 1871, the forty-second United States Congress enacted what was eventually
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 198312 essentially as an enforcement mechanism for the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 The United States Supreme Court elaborated on the
purpose of Section 1983, stating:
As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era
-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its centerpiece-the
role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against
state power was clearly established. Section 1983 opened the federal courts to
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the
claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the Nation...
The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether that action
be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 4

It is important to note that while Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action, 5 it
does not in itself confer any substantive rights.' 6 Instead, the source of substantive
rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment and those portions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states
via incorporation by the due process clause of the
7
Fourteenth Amendment.'

12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
13. See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LrIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983 § 1:3 (4th ed. 1997).
14. Id. § 1:4 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-239 (1972)).
15. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000), federal courts have original jurisdiction over Section 1983 actions. The
statute reads in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
16. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
17. See NAHMOD,supra note 13, § 2:1. The Supreme Court has found the following provisions of the Bill
of Rights applicable to the States:
1) First Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition.
2) First Amendment free exercise and establishment of religion.
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A plain reading of Section 1983 reveals its broad language, the interpretation of
which has been the subject of much litigation and scholarly debate. Consequently,
the law surrounding this statute and its interpretation has become highly nuanced.
While a discussion of each of the many nuances of Section 1983 is beyond the
scope of this Note, discussion of the landmark litigation that either brought about
or clarified some of the nuances relevant to this Note is essential to the later
discussion herein.
1. What Does "Person" Mean?
The use of the word "person" at the beginning of the statute 8 has given rise to
some debate and litigation over the statutory intent behind the usage of that word.
It has been generally understood that natural persons, corporations, and associations
are considered persons within the meaning of the statute.' 9 However, debate and
litigation arose with respect to whether a city or county could be considered a
"person" within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court initially concluded
in its 1961 decision in Monroe v. Papethat those municipal bodies were not persons
for purposes of Section 1983.2 There, the Court pointed to the Reconstruction
Congress's rejection of a proposed bill, the Sherman Amendment, which would
have held cities liable for failing to prevent mob violence as evidence of that
Congress's intent not to allow suit against cities. 2'
The Court revisited that decision in 1978 in Monell v. Department of Social
Services and concluded that municipal bodies were persons subject to suit and
liability under Section 1983.22 There, the Court reviewed the same legislative
history as the Monroe Court and reached a different conclusion, finding that the
language of the statute suggested a clear intent to impose liability on a government
that directly violated the terms of the statute. 23 However, the Court was quick to
note that the statutory language did not evince legislative intent to impose vicarious,
or respondeat superior, liability on municipalities. 24 Thus, under Monell a
municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 where the only source of
potential liability is the actions of the municipality's employee(s). Rather, the

3) Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
4) Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy and self-incrimination.
5) Fifth Amendment "takings clause" protection, i.e. the right to just compensation for a public
taking.
6) Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. The Sixth
Amendment rights to notice, confrontation, compulsory process and counsel are also
applicable to the States.
7) Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment and from excessive bail.
See id. § 2:3.
18. See supra note 12.
19. NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 1:15.
20. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961), overruledin part byMonell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
21.

See MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 22-23 (3d ed. 2006); Monroe,

365 U.S. at 187-92.
22. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
23. Id. at 691-92.
24. Id. at 691-92 & 692 n.57.
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plaintiff must demonstrate that an official policy or custom was the cause in fact of
the alleged constitutional deprivation.2 5
However, under certain circumstances Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to hold
supervisors individually liable for the conduct of their subordinates, despite the
general prohibition on respondeat superior liability.26 To establish such liability, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an "affirmative link between the supervisor's conduct
and the [alleged] constitutional deprivation." 2 Such a demonstration requires the
plaintiff to establish the supervisor's direct participation in or acquiescence to the
alleged deprivation. 21 Hence, establishing liability under this theory requires a
showing of some personal involvement by the supervisor in the alleged
constitutional deprivation and does not allow imposition of liability through the
mere existence of a supervisor-subordinate relationship. In this way, the supervisory
liability jurisprudence comports with the general prohibition on respondeat superior
liability under Section 1983, even though it does not appear so at first glance.
Monroe was also important to the development of Section 1983 jurisprudence
because of its interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "under color of."'29 In that
decision, the Supreme Court found that action could be "under color of state law"
even if the action forming the basis of the suit violated state law.3 ° The Court's
decision in this regard relied in part on legislative history following its decision in
United States v. Classic,from which the Court determined a general acceptance of
the definition of "under color of' announced by the Court in that decision. 3'
Although some scholars have certainly criticized this interpretation,32 the decision
is generally credited with resurrecting the largely unused Section 1983."3

25. Id. at 694-95. It is not necessary that a custom be officially approved or written by the municipality's
governing body for action in accordance therewith to give rise to Section 1983 liability. Rather, action pursuant
to "well-settled practices of government officials" is sufficient to establish custom. See 2 NAHMOD, supra note 13,
§§ 6:1, 6:6.
26. It is important to note that liability under this theory is individual liability and does not require a
showing that the supervisor acted pursuant to policy or custom. See NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 3:96.
27. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990)).
28. Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001).
29. See Jack M. Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with SpecialAttention to Sources of Law,
42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 55 (1989).
30. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of' state law." (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)), overruled in part by Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
31. See id. at 183-87. However, one scholar, relying on the same legislative history, reaches the opposite
conclusion as the Court, arguing that "[a]s a matter of statutory construction Monroe is flatly wrong. Close textual
exegesis of the majority opinion shows that the Court misused legislative history and cited inapplicable precedent
to reach its construction of section 1983." See Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color Of'What Law: A Reconstructed
Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 502 (1985). The author continues by arguing that a proper
reading of the legislative history suggests that the legislature intended "under color of" state law to connote "under
the authority of" state law, which a violation of the law could not be. Id. at 555-56. While this argument may be
the fodder of further scholarly debate, it is of little consequence to the Court's continued interpretation of Section
1983, in accordance with Monroe.
32. See, e.g., Zagrans, supra note 3 1.
33. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Prima Facie § 1983 Case, in SWORD & SHmLD REVISITED: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SEcTION 1983 1 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998).
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2. Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 affords some defendants who are not otherwise absolutely immune
from suit 34 the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.3" While the statutory
language of Section 1983 does not include any defenses or immunities, the Supreme
Court extended qualified immunity to certain public officials beginning in 1967.36
Specifically, the Court extended qualified immunity to police officers, executives,
school board members, mental health administrators, and prison officials.3 7 In so
doing, the Court sought to strike a balance between "preventing, and compensating
for, constitutional violations and... avoiding the overdeterrence [sic] of independent
decision making by government officials. 38
Essentially, the defense of qualified immunity serves two purposes. First, it acts
as a shield to liability for government officials whose alleged actions "did not
violate 'clearly established' law., 39 As the Supreme Court announced in its highly
influential decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' Generally, the law
is clearly established where there is circuit court of appeals or United States
Supreme Court precedent on point, or where the "clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains."41
However, what is "on point" has been the source of some contention. From a
plaintiffs perspective, the "clearly established" inquiry should "take place at a
fairly general level," while defendants would prefer a more specific inquiry that
would only find liability where plaintiffs have presented a "case on all fours."42
While the Supreme Court did not fully resolve this ongoing debate in Anderson v.
34. Generally, states, state or regional legislators acting within a "traditional legislative capacity," judges
not acting "in clear absence of all jurisdiction," and prosecutors acting as "advocates in the criminal process" are
absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability. See NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 1:16 (States); 2 NAHMOD, supra
note 13, § 7.1 (state and regional legislators, judges, and prosecutors).
35. See generally NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8.
36. Id.§ 8:1.
37. Id.
(citing Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975) (mental hospital administrators); Wood v. Stickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board
members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police
officers)).
38. Id.
39. KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LIGATION, (1998) 81 (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The authors note that while qualified immunity bans an award of damages
for the actions of government officials when the law is not clearly established, itdoes not prohibit a grant of
injunctive relief. Id. (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
40. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. This standard significantly altered the qualified immunity defense and courts'
analysis thereof by eliminating the "subjective bad faith" component of the analysis that previously existed. See
BLuM & URBONYA, supra note 39, at 82. This standard permitted the imposition of liability on Section 1983
defendants when a plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendant acted with ill will, or "subjective bad faith," even
where his conduct was otherwise objectively reasonable. This standard effectively eliminated defendants' ability
to succeed on summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the state of mind
component of the "bad faith" allegation frequently presented a factual issue for ajury to decide. See CoLLINs, supra
note 21, at 152.
41. Medina v.City& County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992).
42. See NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:1.
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Creighton,4 3 it did provide some much needed guidance. Specifically, the Court,
while making it clear that a "case on all fours [was] not required,"" did establish
a more fact-specific,4 5 and thus pro-defendant, standard of analysis. 46 Consequently,
courts analyze whether at the time of the events giving rise to the litigation it was
clearly established "within a sufficiently analogous factual setting" that the
government official's conduct amounted to a constitutional
violation. 7 No longer
48
sufficient.
principles"
legal
is an analysis of "generalized
The second, equally important purpose that qualified immunity serves is as an
"entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation."49 The Supreme
Court demonstrated its concern about subjecting government officials to the
burdensome litigation50 process unnecessarily when it effectively eliminated the
"subjective bad faith" component of the qualified immunity analysis. In so doing,
"[t]he Court's purpose was to permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without
resort to trial."'" This purpose reflects the Court's continuing concern with
effectuating the appropriate balance between plaintiffs' right to vindication of rights
and defendants' ability to perform their duties without constant fear of litigation.52
In this vein, the Court's purpose evinces its concern both with the financial cost of
defending a Section 1983 claim and with the "diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues.. .the deterrence of able citizens from accepting public
office...and...the chilling effect on the discharge of official duties."53 For this
reason, the Court has been adamant about resolving the issue of qualified immunity
early in the litigation.54

43. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
44. NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:1.
45. "[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
46. NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:1. This somewhat pro-defendant standard is evident in the burden
allocation under the qualified immunity analysis as well. Once a defendant raises the defense ofqualified immunity,
"'the plaintiff initially bears a heavy two-part burden [and] must show (1) that the defendant's actions violated a
constitutional.. right, and (2) that the right allegedly violated [was] clearly established at the time of the conduct
at issue. Unless the plaintiff carries its twofold burden, the defendant prevails."' Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d
1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir.
1996)).
47. Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992) (citingAnderson,483 U.S.
at 639-40). It should be noted, however, that specific conduct need not have been previously held unlawful for the
law to be clearly established, meaning that government officials may be said to have "notice" that their conduct
violates a constitutional right even in novel factual situations. The essential component of the "clearly established"
analysis is whether given the state of the law at the time of the alleged conduct, the government official would have
had fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002).
48. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1497.
49. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985).
50. See supra note 40.
51. NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:4.
52. See COLLNS,supra note 21, at 150-56.
53. NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:5.
54. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) ("[Wie repeatedly have stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.") Resolving the issue of
qualified immunity early in the litigation also reflects a necessary caution in analyzing this defense because it is
effectively lost if the case is erroneously allowed to proceed to trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,200-201 (2001)
(quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
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Overall, the affirmative defense of qualified immunity provides a "potent
weapon"5 5 in a defendant's litigation arsenal and reflects the ongoing concern of
courts around the country with balancing the rights and interests of plaintiffs and
defendants.
B. The FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part, "[tihe right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated."56 As one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
that has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,57
the Fourth Amendment is appropriate subject matter for a Section 1983 claim.
In general, a plaintiff must establish two separate and distinct elements of a
Fourth Amendment claim before successfully asserting a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.58 First, the plaintiff must satisfy the "threshold [s]tanding
[r]equirement"5 9 by showing that a "search or seizure of his or her person, house,
papers or effects has been conducted by an agent of the government."' This
"standing requirement" entails three basic elements: (1) a showing by the plaintiff
that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, not those of a third party; (2)
a showing that an agent of the government, not "a private person with no
governmental involvement," committed the violation; and (3) a showing that a
"search or seizure of [his]... person, house, papers or effects" has occurred.6' Upon
successfully establishing each of the aforementioned elements, the plaintiff may
then proceed to the second element of his Fourth Amendment claim,
reasonableness.6 2
The Supreme Court has held that the "Fourth Amendment's central requirement
is one of reasonableness. '63 Simply stated, to prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim,
64
the plaintiff must show that the search or seizure at issue was "unreasonable."
Determining the reasonableness of a search requires courts to balance the "privacyrelated and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable."6 5 Specifically, courts are instructed to balance "(1) the nature or degree
of the intrusiveness of the governmental invasion into personal privacy or personal
security represented by the search or seizure in question, as against (2) the gravity

55. See NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 8:11.
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
57. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 2 (1980) (per curiam); NAHMOD, supra note 13, § 2:3.
58. PHILLP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIzURE LAW: A FOuRTh AMENDMENT
HANDBOOK 10 (2005).

59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has not accepted this terminology with
respect to the Fourth Amendment except as it otherwise applies through its normal "constitutionally-based
meaning." However, for purposes of efficiency the terminology is "helpful as a shorthand reference to describe a
separate and distinct branch of substantive Fourth Amendment law." See id.
60. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
61. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
62. Id. at 11.
63. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).
64. See id.; HUBBART, supra note 58, at 11.
65. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331.
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of the governmental interest served by the search or seizure."' This balancing test
reflects the Supreme Court's effort to "avoid giving government officials the right
to conduct searches or seizures at their absolute discretion. '"67
The balancing test, though, is only part of the ultimate determination of
reasonableness. The final determination typically rests on an assessment of the facts
giving rise to the search or seizure under some objective evidentiary standard,
which for the Fourth Amendment is either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 68
Both standards will be discussed in greater detail herein. 69 However, for purposes
of the current discussion of general Fourth Amendment principles, it is simply
important to note that an analysis of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is
essentially an assessment
of the "objective reasonableness" of the government
70
official's conduct.
In the context of a Section 1983 action, a court's finding that the search or
seizure at issue was unreasonable does not preclude a defendant from successfully
pleading qualified immunity. Instead, "conduct unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment [can] still be objectively reasonable for the purpose of qualified
immunity.",71 While this principle is seemingly contradictory by first appearances,
it evinces consistency in the Court's application of the "clearly established" element
of the qualified immunity defense. 72 For instance, if a police officer effects an arrest
of an individual absent probable cause, 71 unless certain exceptions apply 74 such an
arrest generally violates that individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 75 Hence, where
no exceptions apply, the court would deem the arrest unreasonable and find a
Fourth Amendment violation. However, in a Section 1983 action the court would
then examine whether, in light of the "clearly established" law existing at the time
of the arrest, a reasonable officer would have had sufficient notice that his conduct
violated that individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Where an officer reasonably
but mistakenly believed that probable cause existed to effect the arrest or that
certain exceptions applied to justify an arrest absent probable cause, the officer
76
generally will be relieved from liability based on qualified immunity.
At this point a more in-depth discussion of the Fourth Amendment law relevant
to the later discussion herein is necessary to a full understanding of the legal basis
for the Court's decision. Specifically, the following discussion will focus on the law

66.

HUBBART, supranote 58, at 167.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 167 n.20, 169.
69. See infra Part ILB.i.
70. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). The government official's subjective state of
mind is irrelevant for purposes of this inquiry. "An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless
of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action."
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
71. BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 39, at 83 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986)).
72. See supra Part llA.ii.
73. See infra Part lB.i.
74. See infra Part ILB.i.
75. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
76. BLuM & URBONYA, at 84 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-41 (1986)); see also
Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
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concerning Fourth Amendment seizures,77 with specific emphasis on the evidentiary
requirements and standards surrounding such seizures and the necessary use of
force connected therewith.
1. Fourth Amendment Seizures
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes two types of seizures: "physical
seizures and submission-to-authority" seizures.7 8 Physical seizures present the more
obvious case where a government official, often a law enforcement officer,
physically restrains a person and restricts that person's freedom to leave.79 To
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, though, the officer "must
intentionally,not accidentally impose this physical restraint."8 The Supreme Court
has made this principle abundantly clear, stating "[a] Fourth Amendment seizure [of
the person] does not occur [unless]... there is a governmental termination of [an
individual's] freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.'
Common examples of such intentional seizures include the physical detention of a
person to determine the person's identity,82 intentionally shooting a "fleeing
suspect,, 83 or intentionally erecting a police roadblock that physically stops a
fleeing suspect whose vehicle crashes into it.'
The less obvious case of a Fourth Amendment seizure presents in the
"submission to authority" variety. One circumstance commonly giving rise to such

77. Searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment are subject to different albeit similar legal
standards. See HUBBART, supra note 58, at 11. Because the entry into the plaintiffs' residence occupied little of
the court's discussion in Cortez, a complete discussion of Fourth Amendment search law is neither necessary nor
useful in understanding the court's decision. See generally Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). However, to the extent an understanding of Fourth Amendment search law is necessary, a brief
discussion of the basic, governing legal principles provides sufficient grounding.
Generally, the Supreme Court "has expressed a strong preference for [conducting] searches... pursuant
to [a] search warrant." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.1 (4th ed. 2004). While a warrantless search is considered presumptively unreasonable, the Court has
recognized certain exceptions to its general search warrant requirement in the face of exigent circumstances. See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
Although the Court has not articulated an exhaustive list of the emergencies [or exigencies]
involved in this exception, the exception has to date revolved around three general scenarios
with possible variations on each: (1) police in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing felon enter private
premises to arrest the suspect; (2) police or firemen enter private premises to deal with a
situation that is life-threatening or perilous to persons inside or outside the premises or to the
police themselves; and (3) police enter private premises to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence of a serious crime.
HUBBART, supranote 58, at 275. Where these exceptions do not otherwise cover a particular situation, a court will
determine the existence of exigent circumstances based on whether there exists a "plausible claim of specially
pressing or urgent law enforcement need," Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001), and where the "manner
and scope of the search is reasonable." United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).
78. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 120.
79. Id. at 120-21.
80. Id. at 121.
81. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (alterations in original)). Hence,
where the police "stop a fleeing suspect by accidentally crashing into a vehicle driven by a suspect during a high
speed automobile chase," a Fourth Amendment seizure has not occurred. Id.
82. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
83. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
84. Id. (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989)). As Hubbart notes, this type of roadblock
should be distinguished from a police checkpoint "in which the motorist submits to the police show of authority
and stops his car," which constitutes a "submission to authority" seizure. Id. at 121 n.8.
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a seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer approaches and questions an
individual.8 5 The Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment "seizure does
not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions."8 6 "Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations"87 and
is "generally either benign or otherwise absolutely essential to the job-whether in
responding to calls for assistance or investigating possible criminal activity."88
Permitting officers to perform such "benign" questioning allows them to speak with
crime victims, witnesses, or those in need of assistance without the need to assert
some individualized suspicion of criminal activity.89
However, law enforcement officers do not always approach an individual for
"benign" questioning. Instead, an officer may suspect an individual of some type of
criminal wrongdoing and approach the individual to question him about that
suspected wrongdoing. That questioning in and of itself does not necessarily
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure;9° rather, analysis of all the circumstances
surrounding the encounter determine whether such a seizure has occurred. 91
Specifically, "when police approach and question someone whom they.. suspect of
a crime, either initially or at sometime during the encounter," courts determine
whether the encounter amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment by
determining whether, in light of an officer's show of authority, "a reasonable person
innocent of any crime would have believed that he or she (1) was.. free to leave the
officer's presence, or (2) was.. free to refuse the government official's requests and
terminate the encounter. '92 A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs where the court
answers either question in the negative. 93
The aforementioned provides the foundation for identifying the spectrum of
police-citizen encounters that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court have identified.94 On one end of the spectrum are consensual encounters,
which are characterized by the kind of "benign" questioning previously mentioned
and a freedom on the part of the citizen to refuse to answer the questions and
terminate the encounter.95 Such encounters "are not seizures within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and need not be supported by suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing."96

85. Id. at 121.
86. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
87. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004).
88. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 122.
89. Id.
90. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involve 'seizures' of the person.").
91. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
92. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 122. "A reasonable person under this objective test 'presupposes an
innocent person,' not someone who is guilty of a crime and who might very well overreact to otherwise nonthreatening police behavior." Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 430 (1991)).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Oliverv. Woods,209 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The
categories identified in the spectrum "are not static and may escalate from one to another." Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1115 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
95. See Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1186.
96. Id.
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In the middle of the spectrum are investigative detentions, also known as Terry
stops,97 which fall short of a full arrest but nevertheless must be supported by a
reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity 'may be afoot. "98 Establishing reasonable suspicion requires the officer to demonstrate that based on a totality of the
circumstances, he had a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." 99 While an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion," ° an
officer need only articulate a probability, not a certainty, that any criminal activity
has occurred or is about to occur.'0 ' Thus, when assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion, an analysis of the totality of the circumstances presented to the
officer at the time of the detention is essential. The Supreme Court has observed
that:
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from
police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer
draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might
well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders [sic] are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement
officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement.102

Where such considerations yield a particularized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing, the officer is permitted to "briefly detain the individual in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information."'0 3 The amount of time an officer may detain an individual under
a Terry stop is not precisely defined, but rather is generally regarded as "whatever
reasonable length of time is necessary to investigate the suspicion that prompted the
stop."' Following this brief detention, the officer must either arrest the individual,

97. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
98. Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1186 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
99. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
100. See Terry, 329 U.S. at 27.
101. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
102. Id.
103. Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1186 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
104. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 181. "'To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable,
a Terry stop must be limited. The officer's actions must be justified at its inception, and.. .reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. at 181 n. 11 (quoting Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)).
The Supreme Court has stated:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop,
we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to
consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the
court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge engaged in post hoc
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assuming the investigation has provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for doing so,
or release him.'l 5
At the end of the spectrum is a full arrest, which is generally regarded as the most
"highly intrusive" type of police-citizen encounters. 6 Telltale signs of an arrest
may include the "'use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques"' as
such conduct is typically outside the scope of a Terry stop. 7 Unlike a Terry stop,
arrests are subject to the more stringent evidentiary standard of probable cause.'0 8
"Probable cause to arrest exists only when the facts and circumstances within the
officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed."'" Like the reasonable suspicion
standard, probable cause does not require the arresting officer to deal in certainties
but does require more than a "mere suspicion" of criminal wrongdoing." 0
Accordingly, probable cause "has been traditionally defined as a practical, nontechnical evidentiary showing of individualized wrongdoing that amounts to more
than a mere suspicion, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on a
totality of the circumstances.'' I
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may consider the
collective knowledge of all officers present at an investigation and need not base its
ultimate determination of probable cause on the knowledge of the arresting officer
alone."i 2 Generally, that collective knowledge may include hearsay statements,

evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the
objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But the fact that the protection of the
public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, itself,
render the search unreasonable.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
105. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 182 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000)). A Terry stop
may become the "functional equivalent of an arrest where police exceed the limits of a temporary detention." Id.
at 180.
106. Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1186 (arrests are characterized by "highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
107. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. MelendezGarcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the use of such tactics does not automatically turn the
encounter into an arrest, but such tactics are warranted in non-arrest, i.e., Terry stop, situations only when the
"'facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate').
108. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981); cf.United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892,
896 (10th Cir. 2004) ("'Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the
sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that
is less reliable than that required to show probable cause."' (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,330 (1990));
HUBBART, supra note 58, at 180 ("[I]f a detention has a criminal investigative purpose, it need not be supported
by probable cause, and is reasonable if supported by the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion.").
109. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Probable cause does not require
facts sufficient for a finding of guilt; however, it does require more than a mere suspicion." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
111. HUBBART, supranote 58, at 187 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928,
934 (10th Cir. 2001) (Courts analyzing the existence of probable cause after the fact must make their decision "in
light of [the] circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, trained police officer." (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
112. See United States v. Zamudio-Carrillo, 499 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007).
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informant or anonymous tip information, or evidence otherwise potentially
inadmissible at trial." 3 Courts permit officers to use such information or evidence
in their on-scene determination of probable cause so long as the officers have a
reasonable basis to trust the validity of the information or evidence." 4 However,
courts may not consider the subjective belief of the officers concerning probable
cause and must restrict their analyses to the objective evidence proffered in support
of a finding of probable cause." 5
When arresting an individual outside of a "private dwelling," officers are not
required to have an arrest warrant."16 Conversely, when law enforcement officers
arrest an individual inside a private dwelling they are typically required to have an
arrest warrant before entering the home to effect the arrest, absent exigent
circumstances or consent." 7 Similarly, when the intended arrestee is inside the
private dwelling of a third party, the officers must obtain a search warrant before
entering the dwelling to effect the arrest, again, absent exigent circumstances or
consent." 8 The exigent circumstances exception should not be overstated, though,
as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that the exception is narrow,
and "must be jealously and carefully drawn."" 9 However, the exception may be
appropriate when:
(1) police are in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon and enter a dwelling to arrest
the suspect; or

(2)

when police enter the dwelling to deal with a life-threatening or perilous

(3)

situation to persons inside or outside the premises or to the police
themselves; and
when police enter the dwelling to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence of a serious crime. 20

The above list serves only as a guide in the determination of exigent circumstances
since "[t]here is no absolute test for the presence of exigent circumstances because
' 2
such a determination depends on the unique facts of each controversy."' '

113. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 194. However, officers "may not ignore easily accessible evidence and
thereby delegate their duty to investigate and make an independent probable cause determination based on that
investigation." Baptiste v. J.C. Penney, Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
114. HUBBART, supra note 58, at 194.
115. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
116. See HUBBART, supra note 58, at 183 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
117. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) ("Mhe Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house, [and] absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without
a warrant.") (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted); see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 212 (1981) ('The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police
have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search.").
118. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14.
119. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
120. HUBBART, supranote 58, at 183-84. In a similar formulation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that a warrantless entry into a home is allowed if: "(1) clear evidence of probable cause exists of, (2) a serious
crime where destruction of evidence is likely, (3) any such search is limited in scope, and (4) it is supported by
clearly defined indicators of exigency that are not subject to police manipulation." Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing United States v. Scroger, 98 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 1996)).
121. Scroger, 98 F.3d at 1259 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Overall, the issues arising within the spectrum of police-citizen encounters are
numerous and complex, and the issues only increase in complexity when the use of
force factor enters the calculus.
2. Excessive Force Claims
In the seminal case of Grahamv. Connor,the Supreme Court explained that "the
right to make an arrest or investigatory stop carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.' ' 122 However, as other
courts have clarified, "the degree of physical coercion that law enforcement officers
may use is not unlimited."'' 23 Thus, the situation frequently arises where an individual alleges that a law enforcement officer employed an excessive level of physical
coercion, i.e., force, in effecting a Terry stop or arrest. A claim of excessive force
stemming from a Terry stop or an arrest "is most properly characterized as one
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the
right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the person.' 24 Accordingly, such
claims are subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. 125
Simply stated, the test of reasonableness requires courts to consider the "totality
of the circumstances" and determine whether those circumstances warranted the
type of force used. 126 The Supreme Court has stated in greater detail that:
Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable
of precise definition or mechanical application.. its proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
whether he is actively resisting arrest
to the safety of the officers or others, and
127
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
The Graham Court cautioned, though, that in determining the appropriateness of a
a
particular use of force, courts must judge the use of force from "the perspective of' 28
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."'
Accordingly, "'[n]ot every push or shove, even ifit may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge's chambers,' violates the Fourth Amendment."' 129 Thus, like the
analysis of other alleged Fourth Amendment violations, the essential question is
whether the officer's actions were reasonable given the facts and circumstances
presented "without regard to [the] underlying intent or motivation" for such actions.
122. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
123. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
124. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (rejecting substantive due
process as the method of analysis for excessive force claims). It is important to note that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that the Fourth Amendment protections "are not confined to the right to be secure against
physical harm; they include liberty, property and privacy interests-a person's 'sense of security' and individual
dignity." Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001).
125. See Graham, 409 U.S. at 396.
126. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
127. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
130. Id. at 397 ("An officer's evil intentions willnot make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of
force constitutional.").
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In the specific context of the case discussed herein, whether overly tight
handcuffing constitutes an excessive use of force requires courts to look further than
the actual act of handcuffing giving rise to the claim. Generally, courts appear to
agree that overly tight handcuffing alone does not constitute an excessive use of
force. Instead, to state a cognizable claim, a plaintiff must show actual injury from
the purportedly over-tight handcuffing.' 3' The asserted "actual injury" must be more
than de minimus, though it may be either physical or psychological.13 2 Importantly,
the entirety of this analysis must occur within the aforementioned objective
reasonableness framework, and thus is merely an extension thereof.
LII. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
Cortez v. McCauley 3 3 arose from Rick and Tina Cortez's early morning
encounter with Bernalillo County Sheriff's Deputies on May 26, 2001. At 12:24
a.m. that day, a nurse at Saint Joseph's Hospital called the Bernalillo County
Sheriff s Department regarding a two-year-old patient who had complained that her
babysitter's "boyfriend"'134 had "hurt her pee pee."'' 35 Upon receiving this call, the
Sheriff s Department dispatched defendant deputies McCauley, Gonzales, Sanchez,
and Covington to Rick and Tina Cortez's residence. 136 At the time the deputies were
dispatched, they did not have the results of the medical examination of the child,
had not interviewed the child or her mother, and had not sought to obtain a search
warrant for the plaintiffs' residence. 37 Nevertheless, fearing the possible
destruction of evidence related to the child's allegations and concerned that other
children may have been at38the plaintiffs' residence, the defendant deputies decided
to respond immediately. 1
The deputies arrived at the plaintiffs' residence at approximately 1:00 a.m. and
knocked on the plaintiffs' front door. Plaintiff Rick Cortez answered the door
wearing only a pair of shorts and saw two deputies through the closed screen door.
He repeatedly asked the deputies what was going on but they ordered him to step
outside of the house before answering his questions. Mr. Cortez complied with the

131. See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565,575-76 (6th Cir. 2005); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242
F.3d 307,314 (5th Cir. 2001); Ashbrook v. Boudinot, No. C2-06-140, 2007 WL 4270658, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec.
3, 2007) (absence of even de minimus injury renders excessive force claim untenable); Judson v. Mount Desert
Police, No. 06-124-B-W, 2007 WL 2344969, at *7 n.9 (D. Me. Aug. 10, 2007) (same); Vance v. Wade, No. 2:00CV-213, 2007 WL 2021934, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. July 10, 2007) (officer removing handcuffs in response to complaint
about tightness negated excessive force claim).
132. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 n.25 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing Tarver v. City of
Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005)). Some courts require a showing of substantial psychological injury to
state a cognizable excessive force claim under that theory. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 400 (5th
Cir. 2004).
133. 478 F.3d 1108.
134. As the court notes, plaintiff Rick Cortez is actually the husband of babysitter Tina Cortez. Id. at 1113
n. 1.
135. Id. at 1112-13.
136. Id. at 1113.
137. Id.
138. See Appellants'/Defendants' Opening Brief, Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2006) (No.
04-2062), 2004 WL 5332119 at *3-4.
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deputies' order and opened the screen door to exit the house.'39 As he did so, the
deputies took hold of him, placed him in handcuffs, read him his Miranda'4° rights
and seated him in the back of a patrol car where he was subsequently questioned.''
Plaintiff Tina Cortez arrived at the front door of the residence at approximately
the same time the deputies handcuffed her husband. Ms. Cortez then walked back
toward the bedroom to make a telephone call but was stopped by defendant deputy
McCauley who had entered the home. Deputy McCauley seized Ms. Cortez by the
arm, escorted her outside of the home, and seated her in the back of a separate
patrol car from her husband for later questioning. Deputy McCauley then allowed
Ms. Cortez to use his cell phone to make the call she had started to make when she
was escorted from the home. Both plaintiffs claimed that the deputies had seized
keys to the residence, locked the front door, and would not let the plaintiffs return
inside for approximately one hour.'42 The defendant deputies later asserted that the
plaintiffs were kept outside of the residence to prevent the destruction of any
potential evidence located therein.'
As the plaintiffs sat in the patrol cars, the defendant deputies performed a
warrantless search of the home in a purported attempt to find any children in the
residence and to ensure officer safety. After ensuring that the home was secure and
that no children were inside, the deputies questioned both plaintiffs. While
questioning Ms. Cortez, the deputies learned that Ms. Cortez managed a daycare
facility that cared for several children. Ms. Cortez also revealed that she and Raquel
Villegas, the mother of the child complainant, had recently had a verbal altercation
when Ms. Cortez informed the mother that the daycare would no longer take care
of her child.'"
In his statement, Mr. Cortez essentially confirmed his wife's statement. Also,
while providing his statement, Mr. Cortez complained to the deputies about the
tightness of his handcuffs and claimed that they were causing him pain. The
deputies did not adjust or loosen the handcuffs. 4 5
While the defendant deputies conducted their investigation at the plaintiffs'
residence, Deputy Zuniga and Detective Foster contacted Ms. Villegas at the
hospital. Ms. Villegas provided an unsworn, written statement detailing her and her
child's accusation, which included information about a verbal dispute with the
plaintiffs.'46 Detective Foster also interviewed the nurse who had examined the
child complainant, who informed him that "no evidence of penile penetration was

139. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1113.
140. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1113 n.2 (noting that Miranda warnings
are required for custodial interrogations occasioned by an arrest, but not for questioning during an ordinary
investigative detention) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,440 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)).
141. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1113.
142. Id.
143. The court omits this seemingly important fact from its en banc decision, though the defendant deputies
presented this fact to the court in their opening brief. See Appellants'/Defendants' Opening Brief, supranote 138,
at *3-4.
144. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1113.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1113-14.
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present."' 47 Additionally, the nurse identified two possible sources of the child's
vaginal irritation: the urine stained underwear the child was wearing and bubble
148
bath.

Once the defendant deputies received information that the hospital did not find
any evidence of molestation, they released the plaintiffs and allowed them to reenter their residence. According to the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Department's
dispatch report, the defendant deputies released the plaintiffs sometime between
1:49 a.m. and 2:16 a.m. on May 26, 2001.14' Thus, the duration of the plaintiffs'
encounter with the defendant deputies was anywhere between forty-nine to seventysix minutes. Mr. Cortez was never charged with a crime stemming from Ms.
Villegas's allegations. 5 °
Following their encounter with the defendant deputies, the plaintiffs filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico law alleging violations of their Fourth
Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant deputies
unlawfully arrested and interrogated the plaintiffs, used excessive force in detaining
the plaintiffs, and unlawfully entered the plaintiffs' residence.' 5' The plaintiffs
further alleged that Defendant Sheriff Bowdich was liable in his supervisory
capacity for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations purportedly committed by his
deputies.'5 2 The defendant deputies moved for partial summary judgment'5 3 based
on qualified immunity, arguing that they did not unreasonably search or seize either
plaintiff. Defendant Bowdich also moved for summary judgment arguing that he
could not be held liable in his supervisory capacity. Shortly after filing that motion,
each of the defendants, along with the Defendant Board of County Commissioners,
moved to stay discovery
pending the outcome of the summary judgment motion on
54
qualified immunity. 1
B. ProceduralHistory
1. District Court
The district court denied the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment,
finding that the defendant deputies effected a full custodial arrest of the plaintiffs,
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether sufficient probable
cause existed, and that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs,' 55 the defendant deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because
no reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause existed to effect an
arrest. 156 The district court further found that no exigent circumstances existed on

147. Id. at 1114 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 1114 n.3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at I12, 1114.
152. Id. at 1114.
153. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
154. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114.
155. See FED. R. Clv. P. 56(c).
156. See generally Cortez v. McCauley, No. Civ. 02-1458 MCA/WDS (D.N.M. Mar. 17, 2004)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order).
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the night of the encounter that would have justified the defendant deputies entering
the plaintiffs' residence to arrest them without a warrant, and that the law
surrounding that part of the encounter was clearly established.'57
With respect to the plaintiffs' excessive force claims, the district court held that
because the defendant deputies were not justified in arresting the plaintiffs, they
also were not justified in using the amount of force that they did to effect the arrest.
The court found that the law concerning use of force was clearly established and
provided the defendant deputies with sufficient notice that their use of force in this
situation was excessive.' 58 However, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment with respect to the excessive force claims because of an
unspecified genuine issue of material fact related to witness reliability in the case. 59
'
Finally, given its denial of the defendant deputies' qualified immunity defense,
the district court lifted its previously imposed order staying discovery.' 6°
Additionally, the court found that an affidavit the plaintiffs filed in response to the
defendant deputies' motion for partial summary judgment provided good cause to
deny certain parts of the motion and permit discovery on some remaining claims. 16'
Following the district court's denial of their motion for partial summary
judgment, the defendant deputies and Defendant Bowdich appealed the ruling to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Tenth Circuit Panel Decision
On appeal, a three-judge panel reviewed the district court's denial of qualified
immunity'6 2 to the defendant deputies and Defendant Bowdich and the district
court's decision to lift the stay on discovery. The decision, written by Judge
White 163 and joined by Judge Ebel, affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.64 Judge Henry filed
a separate opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part with the
majority's decision.'6 5

157. Id. at 27-30.
158. Id. at 32-33.
159. Id. at 33.
160. Generally, when defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity a stay of discovery is warranted
unless the plaintiff makes a sufficient showing to the contrary. See id. at 40 (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 308 (1996); Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992); Jones v. City & County of Denver, 854
F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 1988)).
161. Seeid.at4O-41.
162. The appellate court'sjurisdiction to review the district court's denial ofqualified immunity only extends
to issues concerning "neat abstract issues of law" and not to the district court's assessment of the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. See Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 991 n.l I (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted), vacated on rehearing en banc by 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007).
163. The Honorable Ronald A. White, United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
164. Cortez, 438 F.3d at 1002.
165. See id.
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a. Seizure of Mr. Cortez
After reviewing the facts and establishing the basic standard of review for
qualified immunity cases,"6 the court initially addressed the seizure of Mr. Cortez.
In light of the facts presented,'67 the court concluded that Mr. Cortez had
sufficiently demonstrated a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that ajury
could find that Mr. Cortez had been arrested without probable cause. 68 The court
then considered the next sequential question in the qualified immunity analysis,
namely whether the law was clearly established at the time the defendant deputies
arrested Mr. Cortez. Answering that question in the affirmative, the court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard was clearly established at the
time the defendant deputies effected the arrest as was the requirement to reasonably
investigate. 69 As such, and because the court concluded that a reasonable officer
could not have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Cortez, the court
found that the defendant deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.17 0
b. Seizure of Ms. Cortez
Next, the court considered the seizure of Ms. Cortez. Again, in considering the
evidence presented in the light most favorable to Ms. Cortez as the non-moving
party, 7' the court found that Ms. Cortez had sufficiently demonstrated the violation
of her clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizure.' In so
holding, the court assumed for the sake of argument that Ms. Cortez had been
subjected to an investigative detention, and found that even under the less stringent
reasonable suspicion standard, the defendant deputies did not have sufficiently
reliable information based on the hearsay statement of a two-year-old child to
warrant a detention. Moreover, the court noted that the child's statement did not
implicate Ms. Cortez in any criminal wrongdoing or suggest that she would destroy
evidence related to the alleged wrongdoing. Accordingly, the court upheld the
denial of qualified immunity with respect to the seizure of Ms. Cortez.'7 3
c. Exigent Circumstances
The court then considered the defendant deputies' assertion that exigent circumstances existed that warranted them entering and searching the Cortez' s home and
arresting them. In rejecting the defendant deputies' argument in this regard, the

166. See supra Part H.A.ii.
167. Specifically, that the defendant deputies grabbed Mr. Cortez and pulled him from the doorway of his
house, handcuffed him, advised him of his Mirandarights, placed him in the back of a patrol car, and questioned

him while he was in the back of the patrol car. Cortez, 438 F.3d at 989.
168. Id.

169. Id. at 990.
170. See id. at 991.

171. Specifically, that (1) the defendant deputies ordered Ms. Cortez out of the house, (2) Ms. Cortez at some
point returned to her bedroom, (3) one of the defendant deputies took away the telephone Ms. Cortez was using,
(4) the deputy escorted Ms. Cortez from the home by the arm and placed her in the back seat of a patrol car, (5)
Ms. Cortez was allowed to use one of the defendant deputies' cell phones while in the patrol car, and (6) that one
of the defendant deputies questioned Ms. Cortez while she was in the back of the patrol car. See id.
172. Id. at 992.
173. Id.
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court found that they had "offered nothing, beyond innuendo and speculation, to
establish a 'reasonable basis, approaching probable cause' that an emergency
existed within the plaintiffs' home."' 74 Furthermore, the court held that the
defendant deputies had not "articulat[ed] any specific facts that led them to believe
the plaintiffs posed a threat to the officers or others."'7 5 Because the court agreed
with the district court's ruling that the evidence did not suggest exigency, it
affirmed the
ruling of the district court in this regard and denied qualified
176
immunity.

d. Excessive Force
After addressing the defendant deputies' exigent circumstances argument, the
court shifted its focus to the plaintiffs' excessive force claims. In addition to setting
forth the general legal standard concerning excessive force claims, primarily
articulated in Graham, 77 the court also articulated the controversial legal principle
that an excessive force claim is subsumed within a wrongful arrest claim, and in so
doing provided the basis for Judge Henry's dissent.'7 8 Specifically, the court, noting
its approval of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' approach, held that "when
an excessive force claim rests solely on an allegation that the force was excessive
because the underlying seizure itself was unlawful the excessive force claim is
derivative: it necessarily exists as a result of the unlawful seizure, and does not
constitute a separate claim for relief."' 79 However, the court was careful to note that
when a plaintiff alleges excessive force during the course of an otherwise lawful
seizure, such a claim does give rise to a separate and independent cause of action.' 80
The courtjustified the application of this rule on two grounds. First, it found that
"[t]o permit a jury to award damages on both claims individually would allow a
plaintiff to receive double the award for essentially the same claims."' 81 Second, it
found that "it would be nearly impossible for a jury to apportion damages between
an unlawful seizure claim and an excessive force claim, when the excessive force
claim is based solely on the unlawfulness of the seizure."' 182 As such, the court
explained that "it is most proper to allow no more than one recovery ... with the level
of force used in effecting the unlawful seizure playing a role in the calculation of
damages for that seizure."'' 83 Thus, it held that if a jury determined that the

174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 993.
177. See supraPart U.B.ii.
178. See Cortez, 438 F.3d at 996, 1002-1004.
179. Id. at 996. The court relied upon several Eleventh Circuit opinions: Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156,
1171 (1 th Cir. 2000) (holding that "a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in
the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim"), and Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055,
1059(1lth Cir. 1987) (finding that "[ilt is obvious that if the jury finds the arrest unconstitutional, the use of force
and the search were unconstitutional and they become elements of damages for the § 1983 violation").
180. Cortez, 438 F.3d at 996 (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (1 th Cir. 2002)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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defendant deputies seized either plaintiff unreasonably, then neither plaintiff could
recover damages separately for their excessive force claims." 8
The court's holding in this regard was not unanimous. Judge Henry, while
concurring in much of the court' s opinion, took exception with the court's following
of the Eleventh Circuit's approach. Initially, Judge Henry argued that the approach
did not comport with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In his view, the Eleventh
Circuit's approach abandoned the fact-specific reasonableness inquiry that is
essential to any alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment and replaced that
inquiry with a "bright-line" rule.8 5 Similarly, Judge Henry found that a proper
reading of the Eleventh Circuit's approach indicated that it applied only to cases in
which an excessive force claim arose solely because there was no justification for
the underlying seizure. 1 6 In his view, Cortez was not such a case because "neither
of the plaintiffs hint[ed] that his or her excessive force claim rest[ed] solely on the
fact that he or she was unlawfully seized."'' 8 7 Therefore, as he explained, "even if
I believed the Eleventh Circuit
rule was appropriate, I would not apply it in the
' 88
circumstances of this case."'
Despite the majority's holding that an excessive force claim is subsumed within
a wrongful arrest claim, the court still considered the merits of each plaintiff's
excessive force claims. Although it previously decided that the defendant deputies
were not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the seizure of either plaintiff,
the court noted that its qualified immunity holding did not "resolve conclusively"
whether either plaintiff was seized unreasonably. Instead, the court explained that
a definitive conclusion would only come "after adversarial testing of plaintiff's
allegations. ' 189 Accordingly, the court performed its analysis of the plaintiffs'
excessive force claims accounting for all possible outcomes of such "adversarial
testing."
i. Mr. Cortez's Excessive Force Claim
First, the court considered Mr. Cortez's excessive force claim, noting that
"adversarial testing might result in a determination that Rick Cortez was (1)
unreasonably arrested; (2) unreasonably subjected to an investigative detention; (3)
reasonably arrested; or (4) reasonably subjected to an investigative detention. '190
Because the amount of force that officers are permitted to use differs between an
arrest and an investigative detention,' 9' the court analyzed each potential outcome
separately, keeping in mind that a distinct cause of action for excessive force would
only arise where the underlying seizure was determined to be lawful. The court
started its analysis by assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Cortez had been subjected to

184. Id. at 996, 1001.

185. See id. at 1002-1003 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989)).
186. Id. at 1003.
187. Id.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 995, 1001.
Id. at 995.
Id. (citing United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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an otherwise lawful arrest.' 92 Then it pinpointed the specific conduct forming the

basis of Mr. Cortez' s claim, namely that one of the defendant deputies applied the
handcuffs too tightly. 193 In finding that the defendant deputies' conduct did not
constitute excessive force under this analysis, the court noted that Mr. Cortez failed
to show any damage to his wrists beyond red marks, and thus did not sufficiently
show more than a de minimus injury stemming from an otherwise justified use of
the handcuffs.' 94 Moreover, the court found that even if Mr. Cortez had sufficiently
demonstrated actual injury, the defendant deputies would be entitled to qualified
immunity because the law was not clearly established that tight handcuffing was
excessive in effecting an otherwise lawful arrest. 95
Next, the court considered Mr. Cortez's excessive force claim under the
framework of a hypothetically lawful investigative detention. Under this analysis,
the court found that Mr. Cortez's excessive force claim would be viable because the
defendant deputies used more force than was reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to effect an investigative detention. 96 In so holding, the court
acknowledged the general permissibility of officers grabbing an individual by the
arm in effecting an investigative detention, but simultaneously noted the limited
permissibility of handcuffing the individual absent an attempt to resist or evade. 97
The court found that the defendant deputies' handcuffing of Mr. Cortez was excessive in effecting an investigative detention because Mr. Cortez was cooperative with
the defendant deputies throughout the encounter and did not attempt to flee. 9
Furthermore, the court noted that the law concerning the permissible use of force
in effecting an investigative detention was clearly established at the time of the
encounter, and thus the defendant deputies would not be entitled to qualified
immunity.
Based on its analysis of both potential outcomes, the court concluded that
there [was] but one way that Rick Cortez could recover damages on the basis of
a discrete excessive force claim. That is the situation where it is determined that
(1) Rick Cortez's seizure was an investigative detention, and not an arrest; (2)
the investigative detention was justified on the basis of articulable suspicion; and
(3) the force used to accomplish the investigative detention was excessive. 19
Because the court determined that the evidence presented could support all three
findings, it affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the
defendant deputies.

192. Id. at 996-97.
193. Id. at 997-98.
194. Id. at 997. Again, the justification for the use of the handcuffs was only hypothetical and is meant to
address one of the possible outcomes of "adversarial testing."
195. Id. at 998.
196. Id. at 999-1000.
197. Id. at 999 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th
Cir. 1993); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1986)).
198. Id. at 999-1000.
199. Id. at 1000.
200. Id.
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ii. Ms. Cortez's Excessive Force Claim
After completing its analysis of Mr. Cortez's excessive force claim, the court
turned its attention to Ms. Cortez's claim in that regard. The analysis for her claim
was somewhat less extensive because the court determined that Ms. Cortez was
only potentially subjected to an investigative detention and not an arrest.20 ' While
the court recognized that a jury might find that the defendant deputies used
excessive force against Ms. Cortez in light of their warrantless, nighttime entry into
her home accompanied by her removal from the home, it nevertheless reversed the
district court's denial of summary judgment to the defendant deputies on this claim.
Similarly, the court concluded that the defendant deputies' would be entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim because their "conduct regarding Tina Cortez was
[not] so clearly unlawful under prior case law that a reasonable officer could not
have believed the conduct was legal. 20 2
However, this portion of the court's decision also marks the other portion with
which Judge Henry did not agree. While noting his continued disagreement with the
majority's adoption of the Eleventh Circuit approach,20 3 Judge Henry found that
even under that approach the defendant deputies "violated Ms. Cortez's clearly
established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. ' '21 In so holding,
Judge Henry argued that the defendant deputies should have known that "they were
permitted to use only as much force as was necessary to secure their own safety and
maintain the status quo. "205 To support his argument, Judge Henry noted that
"[u]nder prior case law in the Tenth Circuit, officers are required to articulate
specific justifications for uses of force during an investigative detention, such as
locking a person in a police cruiser. '' 2° In his view, the defendant deputies'
assertion that Ms. Cortez could have destroyed evidence if left in the house alone
was unsupported by any particularized facts. Moreover, he found that the level of
force used to effect the investigative detention of Ms. Cortez exceeded what "was
reasonable in relation to the threat that she presented. ' 207 Accordingly, Judge Henry
found that the defendant deputies' conduct constituted excessive force and argued
that they had fair warning that their conduct was unlawful. As such, he would have
affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the defendant
deputies.20 8
e. Defendant Bowdich
Finally, the court examined the district court's denial of summary judgment
based on qualified immunity to Defendant Bowdich. Reviewing the district court's
decision for abuse of discretion, 2 9 the court affirmed the denial finding that the

201. Id. at 1001.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 179.
204. Cortez, 438 F.3d at 1004.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1005.
208. Id. at 1004-1005.
209. Id. at 1002 ("The standard of review, despite the Defendants' assertion to the contrary, is abuse of
discretion." (citations omitted)).
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plaintiffs had "made a meritorious showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)" to present
a factual issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment and warrant further
discovery. 210 Accordingly, the court found no basis on which to conclude the district
judge had abused her discretion.2 1'
Following the court's ruling, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
primarily to consider the court's adoption of the Eleventh Circuit's approach
whereby an excessive force claim is subsumed within a wrongful arrest claim. The
court granted rehearing en banc and revisited the panel decision.1 2
3. Tenth Circuit En banc Decision
The court primarily granted the plaintiffs' petition to consider "under what
circumstances, if any, an excessive force claim is subsumed in an unlawful arrest
claim., 21 3 As an initial matter, the court rejected "the notion that an excessive force
claim is subsumed in an unlawful arrest claim in the facts presented."2'14
Consequently, the court vacated the panel decision as it found that its rejection of
the panel's holding in that regard necessitated a change in some of the legal
analysis. As a result, the divided en banc court revisited the entire appeal and
affirmed in part and reversed in part.215 Judge Hartz, joined by Judge O'Brien, filed
216
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority's decision.
Similarly, Judge McConnell filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part with the majority's decision. 217 Finally, Judge Gorsuch, joined by Judges Hartz,
O'Brien, Tymkovich, and Holmes, and joined in part by Judge McConnell, filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority opinion.21 8
After setting forth the same standard of analysis articulated in the panel
decision,219 the court analyzed each plaintiff separately along with the alleged
actions taken against each plaintiff. The following discussion of the en banc
decision will proceed accordingly and will add, where appropriate, the concurring
and dissenting opinions as they relate to each plaintiff and each cause of action.
a. Seizure of Mr. Cortez
In one of the few unanimous findings of the decision, the court found that the
detention of Mr. Cortez constituted an arrest and agreed with the district court's
characterization of the encounter that "the scope and duration of a lawful
investigative detention was quickly exceeded in this case, and the situation became
a full custodial arrest. ' 220 However, the court was divided in its reasoning, though
was unanimous in its result, regarding the subsequent question of whether the

210. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
211.
212.

Id.
See Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

213. Id.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
See supraPart m.B.ii; see also supra Part ILB.ii.

220. Id. at 1116 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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defendant deputies had probable cause to support the arrest of Mr. Cortez. 22' The
majority, in reaching its conclusion, found that the only basis on which the
defendant deputies had reason to suspect Mr. Cortez of committing a crime was the
statement of a "barely-verbal two-year old child," which the Deputies received
second-hand from the treating nurse.222 With this information as the only basis, the
majority, joined by Judge McConnell, concluded that "whether we view it as a need
for more pre-arrest investigation because of insufficient information or inadequate
corroboration, what the officers had fell short of reasonably trustworthy information
indicating that a crime had been committed by Rick Cortez. ' ' 223 As such, the
majority4 found that the defendant deputies arrested Mr. Cortez without probable
cause.

22

Judge Gorsuch, while concurring in the result, was troubled by the majority's
analysis. First, Judge Gorsuch viewed the majority as articulating a "laundry list of
things the officers might have done, but did not do, to corroborate the child's
statement in this case. '225 Although he agreed that further investigation would have
been desirable, Judge Gorsuch argued that "asking whether the officers might've,
could've, or should've done more investigation before effecting an arrest is not the
test for evaluating whether probable cause existed at the time of the arrest., 226 In so
doing, he saw the majority as engaging in precisely the kind of "second-guessing
[of law enforcement
officers] that the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned us
227
against.

Second, Judge Gorsuch found the majority's criticism of the defendant deputies'
reliance on the child's hearsay statement troubling and contradictory.228 As he
pointed out, the majority in one instance found that the child's hearsay statement
alone did not provide probable cause, but later noted that because a particular
hearsay statement may not be useable at trial does not mean that the statement
cannot be a source of probable cause for a warrantless arrest. 229 Judge Gorsuch
argued that the law was well-settled that an officer "may rely on hearsay, even
multiple layers of hearsay, in establishing probable cause when the hearsay has
some indicia of reliability. 23 °
It was with respect to the requirement of reliability that Judge Gorsuch reached
his third, and final, point of contention with the majority's reasoning. Essentially,
he argued against the majority's characterization that the defendant deputies did not
have facts to indicate the reliability of the child's statement. 231' In so doing, he
pointed to the child's mother's purported belief that a crime had occurred, the

221. See id. at 1117 n.9 ("The en banc court is unanimous that probable cause was lacking to effect a
warrantless arrest of Rick Cortez.").
222. Id. at 1116.
223. Id. at 1116-17, 1136-37 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 1117.
225. Id. at 1139.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1140.
229. See id.
230. Id. (citing United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Monaco,
700 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 727 (10th Cir. 1992)).
231. Id.
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reported allegations by hospital authorities, the duty under New Mexico law to
immediately investigate allegations of child abuse or neglect,232 and the child's
description of the crime.233 Thus, while Judge Gorsuch did not believe that the facts
available supported probable cause, he rejected the notion that the defendant
deputies had no facts to support their actions.234 Accordingly, he found that in
considering the totality of the circumstances, the majority correctly concluded that
the defendant deputies lacked probable cause, but he refused to join in the
majority's reasoning.235
Finally, with regard to the seizure of Mr. Cortez, the court had to consider the
issue of qualified immunity. The court was divided as to result and reasoning
regarding the appropriateness of qualified immunity for the arrest of Mr. Cortez.
The majority concluded that it "should have been patently obvious" that probable
cause was lacking to arrest Mr. Cortez based on the unsubstantiated hearsay
statement of a two-year-old child.236 While it recognized that there was no Tenth
Circuit or Supreme Court case directly on-point, the majority noted the Supreme
Court's holding that "'a general constitutional rule,"' such as the probable cause
requirement to arrest, 237 "'already identified in the decisional law may apply with

obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in
question has not previously been held unlawful. ' ' 23 8 However, even absent that
guidance from the Supreme Court, the majority noted the Tenth Circuit's previous
holdings that "a bare allegation of wrongdoing, without any investigation, in some
circumstances, may not give rise to probable cause., 239 Thus, the majority
concluded that the defendant deputies were on notice that their arrest of Mr. Cortez
was unlawful and affirmed the district
court's denial of qualified immunity to the
2 °
defendant deputies on this claim.

In his dissent, Judge Gorsuch, joined by Judges Hartz, O'Brien, Tymkovich,
Holmes, and McConnell, found that neither Mr. Cortez nor the majority had cited
to any case law that would have put the defendant deputies on notice that their
conduct was unlawful.24 1 With respect to the majority, Judge Gorsuch argued that
the only case law it offered in support of its conclusion that the law was clearly
established provided only general guidance to the officers. Furthermore, to the
extent the majority cited to any case law that offered remotely specific guidance,
Judge Gorsuch found that it would have been quite easy for even a diligent officer
to believe mistakenly that his conduct was justified.24 2 Similarly, Judge Gorsuch
found that the only case law cited by Mr. Cortez actually did more harm than good
to his claim and could not be found to have put the defendant deputies on notice that

232. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-3(c) (2005).
233.
234.

See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1140-41.
See id.

235. Id. at ll41.
236. Id. at 1118-19.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1119 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1i20-21.
Id. at 1141-44.
Id. at 1141-43.
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their reliance on the child's statement was insufficient to establish probable
cause. 243 As such, Judge Gorsuch found that the law was not clearly established at
the time of Mr. Cortez's arrest, and he therefore would have afforded the defendant
deputies qualified immunity. 2 "
b. Seizure of Ms. Cortez
The court next considered the seizure of Ms. Cortez, which it found to be less
intrusive than the seizure of her husband. Because Ms. Cortez was not handcuffed,
was not read her Miranda rights, was not the "object of the officers' primary
suspicions," and was allowed to use one of the defendant deputies' cell phones to
make a call, the court concluded unanimously that the seizure of Ms. Cortez
amounted to an investigative detention. 245 Next, the court assessed whether that
detention was based upon reasonable suspicion and unanimously determined it was
not. 246 In reaching that determination the court noted that, like the arrest of her
husband, the defendant deputies' detention of Ms. Cortez was based solely on the
unsubstantiated hearsay statement of the child that in no way implicated Ms. Cortez
in any criminal wrongdoing. 247 Furthermore, the court concluded that the defendant
deputies did not know of any facts to suggest that Ms. Cortez was going to destroy
evidence if left in the house, or that she was endangering any third parties.248
Therefore, the court found that the defendant deputies did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain Ms. Cortez and that a reasonable officer would not have
believed otherwise. 249 As such, the court affirned the district court's denial of
250
qualified immunity to the defendant deputies on this claim.
c. Exigent Circumstances
After analyzing the defendant deputies' seizure of both Mr. and Ms. Cortez, the
court turned its attention to the defendant deputies' argument that exigent
circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry into the plaintiffs' home to
seize them. In promptly rejecting the defendant deputies' exigent circumstances
argument, the court noted that "[t]he Defendants have offered nothing, beyond
innuendo and speculation, to establish objectively reasonable grounds of an
emergency, i.e., an immediate need to protect their lives or others from serious
injury or threatened injury. 25' Moreover, the court rejected the notion that the
"New Mexico law requiring prompt investigation of child abuse allegations
necessarily creates an 'inherent exigency.' "252 Finding that the law concerning
exigent circumstances was clearly established at the time of the defendant deputies'

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 1143.
Cf. id. at 1141,1144.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1123 n.20.
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conduct, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the
defendant deputies in this regard.253
d. Excessive Force-Abandoning the Panel Approach
Next, the court addressed the most complex and contentious issues of the en banc
appeal: the plaintiffs' excessive force claims and the proper analytical framework
for those claims. Although the court appeared unanimous in its rejection of the
panel majority's adoption of the Eleventh Circuit's approach, it divided over what
the proper analysis should be. In the interest of clarity, the discussion of this aspect
of the decision will first address the en banc court's competing approaches then
discuss the plaintiffs' respective excessive force claims under each approach.
i. The Majority'sApproach
The en banc majority, like Judge Henry's dissent in the panel decision, viewed
the panel majority's application of the Eleventh Circuit's approach as misplaced
because it saw the plaintiffs' excessive force claims as stemming from more than
the force used to effect their respective detentions.254 Hence, the majority concluded
that the plaintiffs' claims in this regard were not based solely on the defendant
deputies' purported lack of justification for the plaintiffs' respective detentions. As
such, it refused to decide the appropriateness of the Eleventh Circuit's approach in
situations where excessive force claims arise solely from the absence of power to
arrest or detain because, in its view, the plaintiffs' claims did not present such a
situation."'
Instead, the court supported its rejection of the panel majority's decision by
citing other Eleventh Circuit precedent that provides "'[w]hen properly stated, an
excessive force claim presents a discrete constitutional violation relating to the
manner in which an arrest was carried out, and is independent of whether law
enforcement had the power to arrest. '"'256 In agreeing with this interpretation of
excessive force claims, the majority found that any "contrary interpretation would
conflict with the Supreme Court's direction that courts engage in careful balancing
and examine excessive force claims under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness
' The majority continued by cautioning that "a contrary interpretation
standard."257
risks imposing artificial limits on constitutional claims without any basis other than
a fear that such a distinction might be too fine for a jury (a fear we do not agree
with). 2 58
Accordingly, the majority 259 held that where a plaintiff asserts both an unlawful
arrest and excessive force claim stemming from a single encounter, courts should

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 1123-24.
Id. at 1126-27.
id.at 1127.
Id. (quoting Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11 th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 1127 (citation omitted).
Id.
Judges McConnell, Tymkovich, and Holmes also joined in this reasoning. See id. at 1137.

Summer 2008]

OUT WITH THE NEW, IN WITH THE OLD

"consider both thejustification the officers had for the arrest and the degree of force
they used to effect it."2' The majority elaborated on its ruling, explaining that:
If the plaintiff can prove that the officers lacked probable cause, he is entitled to
damages for the unlawful arrest, which includes damages resulting from any
force reasonably employed in effecting the arrest. If the plaintiff can prove that
the officers used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to
effect a lawful arrest, he is entitled to damages resulting from that excessive
force. These two inquiries are separate and independent, though the evidence
may overlap. The plaintiff might succeed in proving the unlawful arrest claim,
the excessive force claim, both, or neither.26'
Therefore, under the majority's approach, courts must determine: (1) the type of
seizure effected, (2) the underlying justification for that seizure, (3) the amount of
force reasonably necessary to effect it, and (4) the extent to which the force used
exceeded that which was reasonably necessary. Hence, numbers one through three
constitute one
claim, while number four provides the basis for a separate excessive
26 2
force claim.

ii. Judge Hartz's Unified Cause ofAction
Judge Hartz, joined by Judge O'Brien, wrote separately primarily to address the
deficiencies he saw in the majority's approach.2 63 The majority's approach, he
argued, "overcomplicate[d] the analysis of Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure
claims and [was] likely to confuse juries, to the detriment of justice for both
parties. ' '2 4 Under that "pigeonhole" approach, Judge Hartz saw the need to make
"difficult determinations that do not (or at least should not) have any practical
consequences, risks double counting damages, and may undercompensate victims
of unlawful seizures." 265 As an alternative, Judge Hartz proposed a "unified cause

of action" that simply recognizes a violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
entails a three-step analysis. 26 "First, determine what information was acquired by
the law-enforcement officers and when it was acquired. Second, determine what
action by the officers (detention, handcuffing, etc.) was justified by their information. Third, assess damages for any action not justified by the information. '"267
Judge Hartz advocated the superiority of the "unified cause of action" over the
"pigeonhole framework" primarily on the basis of simplicity. 268 According to his
argument, the "unified cause of action" removed the "need to make the oftenunnecessary determination of the line between an investigative detention and an
2 69
arrest," which was an absolute necessity under the "pigeonhole framework.

260. Id. at 1127.
261. Id.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Cf id.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1133-36.
Id. at 1133.
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Under his approach, the only necessary determination is what action was justified
by the information available to the officers.27 ° To the extent that officers' actions
exceeded those which werejustified, the plaintiff would be entitled to compensation
in an amount to be determined by the jury.2 7'
Judge Hartz's explanation of his approach did not end there. Instead, he
articulated the precise manner in which it would be implemented in an actual trial
setting, particularly where the issue of qualified immunity arose.272 Generally, Judge
Hartz would implement his approach through a bifurcated trial. 273 The first portion
of the trial would serve as a basic fact-finding session in which the jury answered
"special interrogatories regarding what information was known to the officers. 274
Following this initial phase of the trial, the trial judge would decide, based on the
jury's answers to the special interrogatories, "what alleged conduct would be
unlawful--or, if a defendant claims qualified immunity, what alleged action would
be clearly established as unlawful., 275 This proposed "intermediate stage" reflected
Judge Hartz's concern over leaving the determination of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to the jury based on his view that it is the court's duty to determine
the existence of probable cause where the material facts are undisputed.276 Finally,
assuming the case is not dismissed during the "intermediate stage," the jury would
reconvene for a second session to determine "what the officers did and the amount
of damages, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled. 277
Alternatively, Judge Hartz suggested jury instructions that "amount[ed] to a chart
that told what result (regarding the existence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion) the jury should reach if it [found] particular facts. ' 278 He offered this
he
trial, which ,,211
suggestion as the "only acceptable alternative" to a bifurcated
,,
indicated as the preferred method for implementing the "unified cause of action.
iii. Mr. Cortez' s Excessive Force Claim
The court first addressed Mr. Cortez' s excessive force claim. The primary focus
of the court's analysis with respect to this claim was on Mr. Cortez' s allegation that
the defendant deputies applied his handcuffs unnecessarily tight and ignored his
complaints about the discomfort the handcuffs were purportedly causing.280 Relying
on the same legal precedent as the panel decision, the court concluded unanimously
that Mr. Cortez had not established a claim of excessive force because he did not
demonstrate anything beyond a de minimus injury, namely red marks on his wrists,
from the handcuffing.28 ' Therefore, because Mr. Cortez had not established a
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constitutional violation in this regard, the court found that the defendant deputies
were entitled to qualified immunity and reversed the district court's denial of
28 2
qualified immunity on this claim.
Judge Hartz concurred in the court's finding on Mr. Cortez's excessive force
claim, but performed a brief analysis of the claim under his "unified cause of
action" framework. 283 The first step in his proposed analysis would be to determine
whether the law was clearly established that the defendant deputies lacked probable
cause to arrest Mr. Cortez.284 If it was not, then the defendant deputies would be
entitled to qualified immunity, but if it was, then the court would still need to
determine if the defendant deputies had reasonable suspicion.285 Judge Hartz
explained that because the court appeared unanimous in its assessment that the
defendant deputies had reasonable suspicion with respect to Mr. Cortez, the next
step in the analysis would be to determine whether the law was clearly established
that some of the defendant deputies' actions exceeded the permissible amount of
force.286 Depending on the outcome of this determination, the jury could assess
damages for conduct it deemed excessive.287
iv. Ms. Cortez's Excessive Force Claim
The court divided as to reasoning and result with respect to Ms. Cortez's
excessive force claim. The majority,joined by Judge McConnell, concluded that the
amount of force the defendant deputies used against Ms. Cortez, namely escorting
her from inside her house and placing her in the back of a locked patrol car, was
excessive in relation to the threat Ms. Cortez posed to the defendant deputies or any
potential evidence.288 Furthermore, the majority concluded that the defendant
deputies should have known that forcing Ms. Cortez out of her home, taking her
keys, and placing her in the back of a locked patrol car violated the clearly
established constitutional principles regarding investigative detentions.289 While
noting that Ms. Cortez did not allege any physical injury, the majority found that the
Fourth Amendment protects "personal security and individual dignity interests,
particularly of non-suspects."29 Consequently, the court concluded that the
defendant deputies' actions constituted an unjustified invasion of Ms. Cortez's

282. Id. at 1129-30.
283. See id. at 1136.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. Interestingly, Judge Hartz noted that it was possible that damages would not have begun to accrue
immediately for any excessive conduct if the defendant deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Cortez and
use some minimal amount of force. See id.
288. Id. at 1131. Judge McConnell, in his separate opinion, advanced the idea that the defendant deputies'
warrantless entry into the plaintiffs' home should be considered as an element in Ms. Cortez's excessive force
claim. See id. at 1137 n. 1. Judge Gorsuch disputed this notion, claiming that the inclusion of that element in the
excessive force claim would create a"double-counting ofdamages." Id. at 1146 n. 15. Judge McConnell responded
that inclusion of the warrantless entry in the excessive force claim would no more constitute double counting of
damages than would inclusion of a single act in multiple causes of action in an ordinary tort suit. Id. at 1137 n. 1.
While this debate did not bear on the outcome of the court's decision on Ms. Cortez's excessive force claim, it
exemplifies the split reasoning and legal analysis of the court in that regard.
289. Id.at 1131-32.
290. Seeid. at ll31.
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personal security that "hardly [could] be considered de minimus."29 ' Thus, the court
denied the defendant deputies qualified immunity on this claim.2 92
Judge Gorsuch strongly disagreed with the majority's holding. First, he argued
that the level of force the defendant deputies used to detain Ms. Cortez did not
exceed what would have been reasonable in an otherwise lawful detention.293 In
support of this argument, he pointed out that "neither Ms. Cortez nor the majority
point to a single case allowing an independent claim for excessive force to proceed
under remotely analogous circumstances."294 Instead, Judge Gorsuch contended that
the cases in which courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover on excessive force
claims alleging non-physical injuries typically involved a threat of "grave force" or
"imminent and severe physical harm." 295 In his view, under the circumstances
presented, the defendant deputies' actions did not amount to excessive force even
though they could have accomplished a similar result with less intrusive means.296
Moreover, Judge Gorsuch argued that even if prior precedent had held that
invasion of an individual's sense-of-security or dignity interests, standing alone,
[could] form the basis of excessive force claims, without reference to the nature
of the police encounter, it does not necessarily follow, as the majority seems to
imply, that any subjective feeling of intimidation qualifies as a constitutionally
sufficient invasion of these interests. 97
As he analyzed Ms. Cortez's claim, he did not find that she had alleged that the
defendant deputies "physically or verbally abused her, or displayed any animus
towards her"; rather, he noted that one of the defendant deputies allowed Ms.
Cortez to use his cell phone to "access.. .the outside world."' 98 Judge Gorsuch
cautioned that if the majority allowed Ms. Cortez to establish an excessive force
claim under such circumstances, then it might "imply the possibility that the use of
virtually any force in the course of an unlawful detention, no matter how mild and
no matter whether any actual injury occurs, is unconstitutionally excessive. 29 9
Judge Gorsuch noted his further disagreement with the majority's denial of
qualified immunity to the defendant deputies on Ms. Cortez' s excessive force claim.
He again pointed to the majority's and Ms. Cortez's failure to cite to any cases with
analogous circumstances that allowed recovery for an excessive force claim as
evidence that the law was not clearly established at the time the defendant deputies
detained Ms. Cortez.3" Accordingly, he would have afforded the defendant deputies
qualified immunity on Ms. Cortez's excessive force claim."'

291. Id. at 1132.
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298. Id.
299. Id. at 1148.
300. Id. at 1149.
301. See id.
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v. DefendantBowdich
Lastly, the court considered the district court's denial of qualified immunity to
Defendant Bowdich and its decision to lift the stay on discovery. Reviewing the
decision under an abuse of discretion standard, the court concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without prejudice and
lifting the stay on discovery based upon its finding that the plaintiffs had made a
"'meritorious showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).""
IV. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by the above discussion, the en banc decision in Cortez v.
McCauley30 3 was complex and considered many pertinent legal issues. The divided
decision underscores the complexity of the issues facing the court and leaves open
many potential areas for further analysis. However, the court's reformulation of the
analytical framework governing excessive force claims that arise in conjunction
with unlawful arrest claims stands out as the area of the court's decision in greatest
need of such analysis. This section will address the apparent shortcomings of both
the en banc majority's framework, 3 4 i.e., the "pigeonhole framework,"3 5 and Judge
Hartz's "unified cause of action,"" and advocate the need for the Tenth Circuit to
return to a more complete version of the panel majority's framework.3" 7
A. The Shortcomings of the En banc Frameworks
1. The En banc Majority Approach
The en banc majority's approach, while purporting to be the most constitutionally
sound, is in fact unsupported by precedent and creates a rigid framework that
promotes an artificial analysis of excessive force claims. In formulating its
approach, and simultaneously rejecting the approach of the panel majority, the en
banc majority quoted the Eleventh Circuit case Bashirv. Rockdale County, °8 which
announced that "[w]hen properly stated, an excessive force claim presents a discrete
constitutional violation relating to the manner in which an arrest was carried out,
and is independent of whether law enforcement had the power to arrest." 3" In so
doing, the en banc majority apparently was attempting to demonstrate the necessity
of two independent causes of action and undercut the principle announced by the
panel majority, which relied on other Eleventh Circuit decisions,"' that an excessive force claim is subsumed within an unlawful arrest or detention claim.

302. Id. at 1132 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
303. 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
304. See id. at 1127.
305. Id. at 1133.
306. Id.
307. See infra Part I.B.ii.d.
308. 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
309. See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1332).
310. See Cortez, 438 F.3d at 996 (citing Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (1lth Cir. 2000) (holding
that "a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or arrest claim
and is not a discrete excessive force claim"); Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158-59 (11 th Cir. 1995) (per
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However, the Bashirquote essentially states the obvious and is inconsequential
to the determination of the appropriateness of the panel majority's rule. The en banc
majority's use of that quotation mischaracterizes the panel majority's rule as
denying plaintiffs recovery for excessive force claims stemming from an unlawful
arrest or detention. 3 ' Indeed, the panel majority's rule allows plaintiffs to recover
for law enforcement officers' use of excessive force in effecting an unlawful arrest
or detention, as the officers' use of force becomes an element of a plaintiffs
damages claim. 3 2 However, the rule simply does not articulate the excessive force
claim as an entirely separate cause of action because of the collateral nature of the
claim.3 13 In other words, the rule recognizes that but-for the unlawful seizure, the
plaintiff would not have been subjected to any force, and thus allows for
consideration of the egregiousness of the force used when apportioning damages
without the need to try a separate cause of action that is inextricably linked.
While the en banc majority argued that the panel majority's rule interferes with
a court's duty to "engage in careful balancing and examine excessive force claims
under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard," it fails to articulate why that
is allegedly SO. 3 14 On the contrary, the panel majority's rule fully allows courts to
assess all of the facts surrounding a particular use of force through the lens of
objective reasonableness and to apportion damages accordingly. Simply because the
excessive force claim is not identified as an entirely separate cause of action does
not mean that the same, established method of analysis cannot be applied.
Similarly, the en banc majority criticized the panel majority's rule as "imposing
artificial limits on constitutional claims without any basis other than a fear that such
a distinction might be too fine for a jury. ' 315 However, it is the en banc majority's
rule that stands out as strikingly artificial, which its explanation of the rule firnly
establishes. In explaining the operation of its rule, the en banc majority stated that:
[i]f the plaintiff can prove that the officers lacked probable cause, he is entitled
to damages for the unlawful arrest, which includes damages resulting from any
force reasonably employed in effecting the arrest. If the plaintiff can prove that
the officers used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to
effect a6 lawful arrest, he is entitled to damages resulting from that excessive
force.

31

Judge Hartz effectively addressed the artificiality of that rule in his separate
opinion, noting that "under the pigeonhole framework it is... necessary to determine
... how much force would have been proper for a (totally hypothetical)lawful arrest.
That additional effort accomplishes nothing." ' 7 Indeed, nothing is more artificial

curiam); Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding that "[i]t is obvious that if thejury finds
the arrest unconstitutional, the use of force and the search were unconstitutional and they become elements of
damages for the § 1983 violation").
311.
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than imagining a lawful arrest where there was none and divining the reasonable
amount of force that would have been required to effect that arrest had it occurred.
This approach strays from the required fact-specific analysis for excessive force
claims318 and delves into the realm of the imaginary as the jury would be required
to imagine circumstances that did not exist.
Similarly, application of the en banc majority's rule promotes the creation of a
subjective and artificial line of reasonableness that encourages the piecemeal
analysis of police-citizen encounters rather than a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis that the Supreme Court has repeatedly encouraged.3 1 9 Essentially, under the
en banc majority's approach the jury would be required to pick the precise moment
in the encounter where the amount of force used became excessive and apply
exactly the kind of 20/20 hindsight against which the Supreme Court has
cautioned.3 2° This kind of second-guessing of law enforcement officers' conduct is
unjust, and is contrary to well-established precedent.32' Conversely, under the panel
majority's approach, the jury could recognize the absence of authority to use any
force to effect an unlawful arrest and consider the reasonableness of the officer's
conduct during
the totality of the encounter when deciding how to assess
322
damages.

Finally, applying the en banc majority's approach in the qualified immunity
context reveals an additional shortcoming. As discussed more fully above,323 one
of the core purposes of qualified immunity is to serve as an "entitlement not to stand
trial or face the other burdens of litigation., 324 However, the en banc majority
adopts an approach that negates this important purpose. Under the en banc
majority's approach in which a plaintiff can assert two independent causes of action
arising from the same underlying conduct, it is conceivable that a district judge may
grant qualified immunity on one claim but not the other. Consequently, the
defendant officer would still be forced to bear the burden of trial with respect to the
remaining claim. As such, the grant of qualified immunity on one claim would be
of little use to the officer who would continue to bear the burden of litigation and
face the daunting prospect of trial where the entirety of his conduct would be
subjected to adversarial scrutiny. Hence, the en banc majority's framework could
in many cases produce results that nullify the usefulness of the qualified immunity
defense.
Overall, the en banc majority's approach suggests a formalistic desire to maintain
two separate causes of action ostensibly for the sake of having two causes of action,
even where a single cause of action would provide a more logical and precedentially
supported analytical framework. This formalistic approach represents a highly
theoretical creation with serious practical flaws that stem largely from the
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majority's failure to provide any guidance concerning how to apply its approach.325
As articulated, the majority's approach lends itself to arbitrary application and
subjectivity, particularly with respect to the analysis concerning the amount of force
reasonably necessary to effect the hypothetically lawful arrest.3 26 Each trial judge
considering a motion for summary judgment and each impaneled jury will have a
different idea about how much force is reasonably necessary to effect an arrest,
meaning that the existence of a second cause of action will hinge on that subjective
assessment. The arbitrary results produced by this approach will not only yield
inequitable results but also frustrate litigation strategy for both plaintiffs and
defendants. With no legal guidance and a guarantee of subjectivity, the pressure to
settle before trial increases dramatically, forcing plaintiffs with potentially
meritorious claims to accept compensation below that which they may rightfully
deserve, and forcing defendants whose conduct may have been perfectly lawful to
pay a settlement figure above the actual value of the case to avoid a potentially
excessive and arbitrary adverse jury verdict. Although these consequences are
potentially present in any pre-trial settlement, the likelihood of them occurring
increases significantly where the law governing a particular cause of action lends
itself to subjective assessment and arbitrary results in every case.
Undoubtedly, the majority did not intend these negative consequences by
adopting its approach. However, the current articulation of this approach will allow
such consequences to plague joint excessive force/wrongful arrest cases until the
court revisits its analytical framework.
2. Judge Hartz's Unified Cause of Action
Judge Hartz's formulation of a unified cause of action is initially enticing as it
appears to simplify the analysis articulated by the majority. However, consideration
of its practical application reveals its shortcomings in two main areas: its
complexity and invasiveness. With respect to the former, the bifurcated trial process
Judge Hartz proposed appears both intricate and time consuming.327 The first
session of the trial would require the court and the attorneys representing each party
to agree on the disputed material facts in the case that are of consequence to the
ultimate determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, which may be
easier said than done.3 28 The mere process of agreeing on the facts that the jury
would be charged with deciding in its special interrogatories 329 could occupy a
significant amount of the court's resources as such a process would undoubtedly
entail hearings and possibly briefing. Once the parties finally agreed, another
dispute would arise with respect to the proper wording of the special interrogatories,
which could again require intervention by the court. Upon resolution of this likely
dispute, the court could begin the first portion of the trial, which admittedly would
be the one part of this complex process without any foreseeable glitches.
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Although the first portion of the trial would likely be non-problematic, the
problems would return in the "intermediate stage. ' 330 Specifically, this stage would
seemingly be lengthy and overly burdensome on thejury. As Judge Hartz explained,
this stage would require the court to determine, based on the jury's answers to the
special interrogatories regarding disputed facts, what alleged conduct by the law
enforcement officers was unlawful and whether the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity. 331 Such a determination would certainly require the court at
least to hear oral arguments and likely to allow time for the parties to brief the
issues, particularly with respect to qualified immunity. This lengthy process would
require the jury to recess and, upon reconvening, to endure again the hardship of
leaving jobs and families to serve. As a practical matter, especially in New Mexico,
such hardship would not be minimal as a federal jury draws from a pool of citizens
that may have to travel hundreds of miles from their homes to serve.
The purpose behind the "intermediate stage" also raises the second shortcoming
of Judge Hartz's approach, namely its invasiveness. Despite acknowledging the
existence of precedent mandating otherwise, Judge Hartz explained that he believed
it was the duty of the judge and not the jury to determine the existence of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.3 32 However, the reasoning he used to support this
belief was largely circular in the context of his proposed framework. Specifically,
while he acknowledged that Tenth Circuit precedent "hold[s] that the issue of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion is for the jury when the historical facts are
disputed,"3'33 he found that when the facts are undisputed, courts "should not leave
to the jury to determine whether those facts establish probable cause or reasonable
' The latter finding, however,
suspicion."334
is misplaced because the first phase of
the trial would only create the illusion that the historical facts of the case were
undisputed. Once the case proceeds to trial, and does so largely because of a
disputed factual record, it then becomes the province of the jury to resolve both the
facts and the legal implications of those facts. 335 Allowing the trial judge, while
undoubtedly the more apt legal scholar, to rule on the existence of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion and subsequently decide the availability of qualified
immunity where the factual record is clearly disputed would constitute an
unprecedented invasion of the province of the jury. Without more than a desire for
judges rather than juries to determine the existence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, this approach appears untenable and contrary to established precedent.
Finally, the second trial session would appear to carry many of the same
problems that plagued the lead-up to the first session. Since this session would be
devoted to determining "what the officers did and the amount of damages, if any,
to which the plaintiff is entitled, 336 it is likely that to resolve the issue of what the
officers did, special interrogatories would again be necessary. As discussed above,
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the drafting of these interrogatories could potentially consume significant court
resources. Furthermore, because the precise interrogatories needed could not be
determined before the conclusion of the intermediate stage, these interrogatories
would have to be drafted before the commencement of the second session thereby
delaying the trial further and imposing greater hardship on the jury. Thus, the
problems plaguing the beginning of the trial process would remain through its final
stages, evincing the unworkable nature of this proposed "unified cause of action."
B. An Alternative Approach
As the above discussion demonstrates, both of the analytical frameworks
suggested in the en banc decision are fraught with difficulties, both practical and
theoretical. The en banc court, in its effort to correct what it perceived as an error
in the panel majority's analytical framework, created a framework that only
convolutes an already difficult legal analysis. The alternative approach suggested
in this section essentially amounts to a more encompassing version of the panel
majority's rule, and provides a more straightforward analytical approach that would
result in more equitable results for all concerned parties.
Initially, it is important to recognize the two potential types of excessive force
claims that a plaintiff could raise in connection with a Fourth Amendment seizure.
In the first type, a plaintiff could allege excessive force solely because the
underlying seizure was unlawful.3 37 Conversely, in the second type of claim a
plaintiff would allege excessive force regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying
seizure.338 The en banc majority seemingly viewed the panel majority's rule as
applying only to the first kind of claim,3 39 and the panel majority's wording of its
rule could potentially support such a reading. 3 OHowever, such a narrow application
of the panel majority's proposed rule need not be so. Instead, the panel majority's
rule could apply to both types of claims once it was determined that the underlying
seizure was unlawful.
Under this suggested approach, an excessive force claim would always be
subsumed within an unlawful seizure claim where the conduct at issue stems from
a single encounter. 34' To apply this rule, ajury would only need to consider a simple
analytical framework. First, the jury would determine what type of Fourth
Amendment seizure, if any, occurred. Next, the jury would assess whether the
officer effecting that seizure had the proper evidentiary basis to do so, i.e.,
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which would determine whether the seizure
was lawful or unlawful. Then the jury would assess, under the totality of the
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circumstances presented, the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct.
Finally, and based on that assessment, the jury would determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled. Hence, the final two elements are
essentially merged as a mechanism to calculate damages.
Aside from its simplicity, a significant benefit of this approach is the strong
assurance it provides against the double-counting of damages. For instance, under
the en banc majority's approach, a highly probable result of that framework is that
a plaintiff would twice recover damages for the same unlawful conduct.
Specifically, it is unlikely that a jury apportioning damages would forget the part
of the encounter that was purportedly reasonable when assessing damages for the
conduct that was unreasonable or excessive. Hence, a plaintiff would recover for
the "reasonable" use of force to effect the unlawful seizure both in the unlawful
arrest and excessive force claim. Conversely, under the above-suggested approach,
where the underlying seizure is unlawful, any force used in connection with that
seizure becomes an element of damages. Thus, where an officer's conduct is either
particularly benign or particularly egregious, the jury can assess damages
accordingly without the need to artificially parse the damages into two separate
claims.
Finally, this alternative approach offers a framework that comports with the core
purpose of qualified immunity, namely the defense against standing trial.342 The
district judge initially deciding qualified immunity would not be faced with the
potential result of granting qualified immunity on one claim but not the other.
Instead, the judge would only have to decide whether the defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity on the entire encounter. This suggested analysis would proceed
as follows:
1)

2)

Examine the lawfulness of the detentiona)
If the judge determines that the detention was lawful, then the judge
considers the alleged excessive use of force.
b) If the judge determines that the detention was unlawful, then the
judge considers whether it was clearly established that the detention
would have been unlawful.
i)
If the judge determines that it was clearly established that the
detention would have been unlawful, then the qualified
immunity analysis ends and the judge denies the defendant
qualified immunity on the entire encounter.
ii)
If the judge determines that it was not clearly established that
the detention would have been unlawful, then the judge
considers the alleged excessive use of force.
If necessary, examine the use of forcea) If the judge determines that the use of force was appropriate, then
the judge grants the defendant qualified immunity.
b) If the judge determines that the use of force was excessive, then the
judge considers whether it was clearly established that the use of
force would have been excessive.

342. See supraPart li.A.ii.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

i)
ii)

[Vol. 38

If the judge determines that it was clearly established that the
use of force would have been excessive, then the judge denies
the defendant qualified immunity on the entire encounter.
If the judge determines that it was not clearly established that
the use of force would have been excessive, then the judge
grants the defendant qualified immunity.

Therefore, where a defendant officer's decision to detain a plaintiff was
unreasonable, the court would deny the defendant qualified immunity with respect
to the entire encounter. Similarly, where a defendant officer's decision to detain a
plaintiff was reasonable but his conduct in effecting the detention was
unreasonable, the court would deny qualified immunity entirely. Hence, a defendant
either receives qualified immunity or he does not, thus eliminating the artificiality
of granting qualified immunity on one claim but forcing the defendant to stand trial
on a second claim revolving around the same facts and conduct.
Overall, this alternative approach benefits from simplicity and fairness, and, as
a consequence, workability. It provides an alternative to the overly rigid and
artificial en banc majority approach and to the overly complex and invasive "unified
cause of action" approach. In this regard, it acknowledges the legally sound
framework established by the panel majority that was unfortunately overruled and
extends that inherently sound framework to a broader range of claims.
V. CONCLUSION
While the needed change may be slow in coming, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence within the Tenth Circuit would certainly benefit from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals revisiting its en banc decision in Cortez v. McCauley and
reformulating the analytical framework for excessive force claims that it established
in that decision. The interests of justice and simplicity would be best served by a
shift to the above-suggested approach.

